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INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES, RULE 13e-3,
AND PREMIUMS IN GOING-PRIVATE
TRANSACTIONS
JEFFRY DAVIS AND KENNETH LEHN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The source of stockholder gains in going-private transactions has in-
trigued scholars and public-policy makers since the advent of these trans-
actions in the early 1970s.1 The social and economic desirability of these
transactions has been debated. Some argue that they promote efficiency
by strengthening managerial incentives to maximize firm value.2 Others
argue that, instead of creating value, these transactions largely redistrib-
ute wealth from other corporate claimants, including bondholders, em-
ployees, and taxpayers, to stockholders.'
Critics of management-led going-private transactions argue that they
are especially pernicious because they involve a conflict of interest that
enables managers to redistribute wealth from their principals, the stock-
holders, to themselves.4 According to this argument, these transactions
are inspired by managers' superior information concerning the future
prospects of their respective firms. Although stockholders receive premi-
ums in these transactions, it is argued that they receive less than what
their respective managers believe their companies' stock to be worth.
* U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and University of Pittsburgh, respectively. The
Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims any responsibility for any
private publication or statements by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of Jeffry Davis' colleagues
on the staff of the Commission.
1. In this Article, going-private transactions are defined as corporate-control transactions that
convert free-standing, publicly traded companies into private entities. Frequently, the acquiring en-
tity in these transactions is a shell company that is owned largely by members of the incumbent
management team; we refer to these transactions as "management-led" going-private transactions.
Alternatively, the acquiring company may be an unaffiliated privately held operating company or
investment firm (e.g., Kohlberg Kravis Roberts). We refer to these transactions as "third-party"
going-private transactions.
2. See, eg., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Take-
overs, AMER. ECON. REV., May 1986, at 323.
3. See, eg., Morey McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205 (1988); An-
drei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKE-
OVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33-67 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).
4. See infra note 7 for examples of articles that express this concern.
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According to these critics, managers who expect to earn positive returns
in going-private transactions inherently violate their fiduciary duty to
maximize shareholder value.
This criticism of management-led going-private transactions has per-
sisted since their evolution. In a frequently cited speech to the Law Ad-
visory Council at Notre Dame Law School in 1974, A.A. Sommer, Jr.,
then Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
deplored the proliferation of going-private transactions as "a perversion
of the whole process of public financing, and a course that inevitably is
going to make the individual shareholder even more hostile to American
corporate mores and the securities markets than he already is." 5 More
recently, Professors F. Hodge O'Neal, whom we honor at this confer-
ence, and Robert Thompson described the potential conflict of interest in
these transactions:
Management can pick the time for the transaction and set the price with no
input from the public shareholders. The price may include a substantial
premium over the current market price but the offer may come at a time
when the market for that particular company or its industry is depressed
and outsiders do not yet see the favorable signs of an upturn that are known
to the insiders. 6
Articles echoing similar concerns about conflicts of interest in manage-
ment-led going-private transactions have appeared regularly in scholarly
journals and the business press since the mid-1970s.2
5. Full Text of Commissioner Sommer's Remarks on "Going Private," Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 278, at D-1 (Nov. 20, 1974).
6. 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS § 5:27, at 163-64 (2d ed. 1985).
7. Scholarly articles that have acknowledged the potential conflicts of interest in management-
led going-private transactions include Victor Brudney, A Note on Going Private, 61 VA. L. REV.
1019 (1975); Lewis D. Solomon, Going Private: Business Practices, Legal Mechanics, Judicial Stan-
dards and Proposals for Reform, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 141 (1975); Edward F. Greene, Corporate
Freezeout Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1976); Victor Brudney & Marvin A.
Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978).
In the 1980s, a series of articles in Barron's expressed concern over conflicts of interest in manage-
ment-led going-private transactions. See Lauren R. Rublin, Buyout or Sell-Out? Are Shareholders
Getting a Raw Deal?, BARRON'S, Nov. 18, 1985, at 15; Benjamin J. Stein, Where are the Sharehold-
ers' Yachts?: But John Kluge Pockets Billions from Metromedia's LBO, BARRON'S, Aug. 18, 1986, at
6-7; William M. Alpert, Pie with Crust: Are Pizza Inn's Shareholders Being Served a Raw Deal?,
BARRON'S, Sept. 15, 1986, at 15; Benjamin J. Stein, Buyout or Sellout? A Critic Reviews Viacom's
LBO Offer, BARRON'S, Oct. 6, 1986, at 6-7, 31-32; Benjamin J. Stein, Shooting Fish in a Barrel: Why
Management Always Makes a Bundle in an LBO, BARRON'S, Jan. 12, 1987, at 6-7, 20-24; Benjamin
J. Stein, Loss of Values: Did the Amsted LBO Shortchange Shareholders?, BARRON'S, Feb. 16, 1987,
at 8; Benjamin J. Stein, A Saga of Shareholder Neglect: Whose Interest was this Management Protect-
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Despite proposals for stricter regulation of management-led going-pri-
vate transactions,8 the only federal regulation designed to mitigate con-
flicts of interest in these transactions is SEC Rule 13e-3, which the SEC
adopted in 1979.9 This regulation attempts to eliminate the supposed
informational advantage insiders possess in management-led going-pri-
vate transactions by requiring acquirers to disclose more information
than their counterparts in other corporate-control transactions. Follow-
ing the leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco in 1988, SEC Chairman David
Ruder revealed that the SEC was considering expanding the scope of
Rule 13e-3 in two ways: (1) by increasing the amount of information that
must be disclosed in 13e-3 transactions; and (2) by extending Rule 13e-3
to third-party going-private transactions in which incumbent managers
are likely to be equity participants, such as Kohlberg Kravis Roberts'
acquisition of RJR Nabisco. 10 Advocates of extending the scope of Rule
13e-3 to a broader set of corporate-control transactions argue that these
suspect deals are plagued by conflicts of interest similar to those existing
in management-led going-private transactions.
There are numerous scholarly articles discussing both the efficacy of
Rule 13e-3 and the SEC's authority to promulgate it.11 Little evidence
ing?, BARRON'S, May 4, 1987, at 8-9, 70-75; Benjamin J. Stein, Dear Mr. Ruder: Your View of
Management LBOs is Simply Dead Wrong, BARRON'S, Jan. 23, 1989, at 44.
8. Brudney, for example, has argued that the inherent conflict of interest in going-private
transactions is so severe that they should be prohibited. See Brudney, supra note 3. Others, includ-
ing the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), have proposed that the SEC be allowed to
determine whether prices offered in going-private transactions are "fair." See Proposed Rule 13e-3,
42 FED. REG. 60,100 (1977).
9. Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, Securities Act Release
No. 6100 [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,166 (Aug. 2, 1979) [hereinafter
Going Private Transactions]. This rule did not include the provision that would have allowed the
SEC to regulate the substantive fairness of these transactions, as described supra note 8.
10. For descriptions of these proposals to expand the scope of Rule 13e-3, see Thomas E. Ricks,
SEC Staff Weighs Stronger Requirements for Disclosure by Buy-Out Participants, WALL ST. J., Dec.
22, 1988, at A4; Thomas E. Ricks, SEC to Vote on Possible Plan to Expand Disclosure Requirements
for Buy-Outs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 1988, at A3; SEC May Propose Expanding Scope of Going-
Private Disclosure Rules, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 7-9 (Jan. 6. 1989); Tax Legislation
Won't Slow Down LBOs; New Curbs are not Needed, Ruder Says, See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.4,
at 153-54 (Jan 27, 1989); SEC Must Report by May I on LBO-Related Regulatory Action, Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 512-14 (Apr. 7, 1989).
11. See John A. James, Jr., Note, Going Private: An Analysis of Federal and State Remedies, 44
FORDHAM L. REVIEW 796 (1976) (evaluating SEC rule proposals); Anne Jentry, Note, The Develop-
ing Law of Corporate Freeze-outs and Going Private, 7 Loy. U. CHL L.J. 431 (1976) (same); Larry R.
Schreiter, Note, SEC Rulemaking Authority and the Protection of Investors: A Comment on the Pro-
posed 'Going Private'Rules, 51 IND. L.J. 433 (1976) (same); Christopher J. Brogan, Note, Fairness in
'Going Private' Transactions: Federal Authorization of Substantive Regulation, 58 B.U. L. REV. 792
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exists, however, as to whether management's informational advantage
actually works to the detriment of other shareholders in going-private
transactions.12 Furthermore, no evidence exists on the effect that Rule
13e-3 actually has had on premiums in going-private transactions. This
Article attempts to shed some empirical light on these issues by examin-
ing premiums paid in a large sample of going-private transactions be-
tween 1980 to 1988. Among the questions we examine are the following:
" Are premiums lower in going-private transactions initiated by managers
than in going-private transactions initiated by third parties?
* Did premiums in management-led going-private transactions increase
following the adoption of Rule 13e-3?
" Are premiums in third-party going-private transactions in which man-
agement is likely to be an equity participant (i.e., going-private transac-
tions that presently are exempt from Rule 13e-3) lower than premiums
in Rule 13e-3 transactions?
We find that premiums are not systematically lower in transactions
initiated by management, suggesting that management's possession of su-
perior information does not work to the detriment of shareholders in
these transactions.
Theoretically, it could be argued that this result obtains because Rule
13e-3 is effective in eliminating the informational advantage management
possesses in these transactions. If so, premiums in management-led go-
(1978) (same); Bruce Stumpf, Note, SEC Proposed 'Going Private' Rule, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 184
(1978) (same); Randal J. Brotherhood, Note, Rule 13e-3 and the Going Private Dilemma: The SECs
Quest for a Substantive Fairness Doctrine, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 883 (1980); James Roberts Lyons, Jr.,
Note, Fairness in Freezeout Transactions: Observations on Coping with Going Private Problems, 69
KY. LJ. 77 (1980-81); Christopher R. Gannon, An Evaluation of the SEC's New Going Private Rule,
7 J. CORP. L. 55 (1981); Stuart Robin Kaplan, Note, Corporate Morality and Management Buyouts,
41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1015 (1984); Patrick S. Dunleavy, Note, Leveraged Buyout, Management
Buyout, and Going Private Corporate Control Transactions: Insider Trading or Efficient Market Eco-
nomics?, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 685 (1986); Gregory J. Schwartz, Comment, Regulation of Lever.
aged Buyouts to Protect the Public Shareholder and Enhance the Corporate Image, 35 CATH. U. L.
REv. 489 (1986); Dale Arthur Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating orAppro-
priating Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 207 (1988); James R. Repetti, Management
Buyouts Efficient Markets, Fair Value, and Soft Information, 67 N.C. L. REv. 121 (1988); Bill
Shaw, Resolving the Conflict of Interest in Management Buyouts, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 143 (1990);
Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The SEC's Going Private Rules-Analysis and Developments, 19 Svc. REG. L.J.
139 (1991).
12. One exception is Harry DeAngelo et al., Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder
Wealth, 27 J. L. & EcON. 367 (1984). The authors compare premiums paid to minority sharehold-
ers in going-private transactions and premiums paid to target shareholders in interfirm tender offers.
They conclude "that the similarity of stockholder gains observed in going-private and arms-length
acquisitions suggests that, for our sample firms, going-private transactions did not result in the sys-
tematic exploitation of minority stockholders." Id. at 401.
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ing-private transactions should have increased following the adoption of
Rule 13e-3. We find, however, that premiums actually decreased, though
not significantly, after the adoption of Rule 13e-3. Finally, our results
indicate that premiums actually are higher in the suspect transactions
that presently are exempt from Rule 13e-3 (i.e., third-party going-private
transactions in which management is likely an equity participant) than
they are in Rule 13e-3 going-private transactions. This last result sug-
gests that, as an empirical matter, the purported information asymme-
tries in the suspect transactions do not work to the detriment of
shareholders.
II. DESCRIPTION AND DISCUSSION OF RULE 13e-3
In its 1979 release announcing the adoption of Rule 13e-3, the SEC
stated that the action was "necessary and appropriate in the public inter-
est and for the protection of investors because of... the possible deleteri-
ous effects to investors and their confidence in securities markets absent
full and adequate disclosure."13 The adoption release went on to state
that "the Commission believes that the protection of investors will be
enhanced substantially by the more meaningful disclosure, particularly
with respect to the fairness of going-private transactions, and the other
protections afforded by Rule 13e-3." '14
From the above remarks and from the very nature of Rule 13e-3, it is
obvious that the SEC viewed going-private transactions in which the ac-
quiring entity is affiliated with the issuer as potentially more hazardous
to investors than proposed acquisitions by unaffiliated third parties.
When the party seeking to acquire the corporation was unaffiliated with
the issuer or its management, stockholders could, presumably, rely on
the counsel of management as to the fairness of the proposed transaction.
Such counsel, however, became suspect when management was on the
side of the transaction opposite the stockholders. Rule 13e-3 seeks to
remedy this situation by forcing management to treat an affiliated bid in
the same fashion as a third-party bid, at least in terms of performing the
same kind of bid analysis as would be carried out for a third-party bid
and disclosing the findings of the analysis to shareholders. In other
words, Rule 13e-3 is designed to force management, by means of disclo-
13. Going Private Transactions, supra note 9, at 82,123.
14. Id. at 82, 124-125.
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sure requirements, to provide the same counsel to shareholders as it
would if the bid came from a third-party.
Given this objective, it is not surprising that the key elements of Rule
13e-3 are required disclosures of the pros and cons of the proposed trans-
action and its fairness to shareholders. The rule, in fact, highlights the
importance of these key elements by requiring that the information called
for by Items 7, 8, and 9 of Schedule 13e-3 (relating to the purpose for and
fairness of the transaction and certain reports, opinions, appraisals, and
negotiations) be prominently set forth in a "special factors" section near
the front of the disclosure document."5 Most of the other information
required on Schedule 13e-3 overlaps with the requirements of the tender
offer or proxy rules, but Items 7, 8, and 9 set Rule 13e-3 apart.
Item 7 calls for a statement of (1) the purpose for the transaction; (2)
the alternative means considered to accomplish the purpose and why
such alternatives, if any, were rejected; (3) the reasons for the structure of
the transaction and for undertaking it at the time; and (4) the effects of
the transaction on the issuer, its affiliates, and unaffiliated security hold-
ers.16 An instruction in Schedule 13e-3 makes it clear that the statement
as to the effects of the transaction must include a detailed discussion of
the benefits and detriments of the transaction.' 7
Item 8 requires extensive disclosure relating to the fairness of the
transaction. First, it requires a statement as to whether the issuer or
affiliate reasonably believes that the transaction is fair to security holders.
Any director's dissent or abstention from voting on the transaction must
be disclosed, along with the identity of any such director and his or her
reasons for dissenting or abstaining."8 Second, this Item requires a dis-
cussion of the material factors upon which the belief as to fairness is
based. An instruction suggests that the required discussion normally will
include whether the consideration offered is fair in relation to (1) current
market prices; (2) historical market prices; (3) net book value; (4) going-
concern value; (5) liquidation value; (6) the price paid in previous
purchases by the issuer or affiliates; (7) any report, opinion, or appraisal;
and (8) firm offers made by unaffiliated parties.' 9 Third, Item 8 requires
disclosure as to whether the approval of a majority of the unaffiliated
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(e)(3)(i) (1991).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100, Item 7 (1991).
17. Id.
18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100, Item 8 (1991).
19. Id.
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security holders is required, whether the independent directors have re-
tained an unaffiliated representative to negotiate the terms of the transac-
tion or to prepare a report concerning its fairness, and whether the
transaction was approved by a majority of the independent directors.20
Finally, the item requires a description of any firm offer made by unaffili-
ated parties and the reason for its rejection.21
Item 9 requires a description of any report, opinion, appraisal, and
certain negotiations, including the identity of the preparer, the qualifica-
tions of the preparer, how the preparer was selected, and any material
relationships between the preparer and the issuer. A copy of each report,
opinion, or appraisal must also be filed as an exhibit.22
The additional information disclosed in Items 7, 8, and 9 of Schedule
13e-3 is supposed to benefit shareholders in management-led going-pri-
vate transactions in at least three ways: (1) by strengthening the share-
holders' bargaining position; (2) by increasing the likelihood of
competing bids; and (3) by enhancing the threat of shareholder litigation
in the event of a "low" offer price. However, countervailing arguments
question whether the disclosures required in Items 7, 8, and 9 actually
redound to the benefit of shareholders in these transactions.
First, the empirical importance of the purported informational advan-
tage managers possess in management-led going-private transactions is
unclear. There is obvious logic in the argument that managers face an
inherent conflict of interest when they simultaneously serve as a fiduciary
for shareholders and a bidder for the firm. However, in the absence of
Rule 13e-3, managers are not unconstrained in their ability to buy their
respective companies at cheap prices. Market forces, in the form of
competing bids or the threat of competing bids, mitigate managers' abil-
ity to redistribute wealth from the company's stockholders to themselves.
In addition, managers in management-led going-private transactions are
constrained, at least in part, by state law, which provides shareholders
with appraisal remedies and private rights of action to challenge viola-
tions of managers' fiduciary duties. Rule 13e-3 is predicated on the as-
sumption that these market and legal forces only inadequately deter
management-led going-private transactions at artificially low prices. The
effectiveness of these forces, however, and hence the severity of the infor-
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100, Item 9 (1991).
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mation asymmetry problem in management-led going-private transac-
tions, ultimately are empirical issues.
Even if information asymmetries are empirically significant in manage-
ment-led going-private transactions, the effectiveness of Rule 13e-3 in
mitigating these asymmetries is subject to debate. One can argue that the
additional information disclosed in Items 7, 8, and 9 is not particularly
valuable to investors, either because it involves boilerplate language or is
already impounded in stock prices. If these additional disclosures are not
material in an economic sense, then they will not confer benefits on tar-
get-company shareholders. Furthermore, it can be argued that Rule 13e-
3 actually may work contrary to the interests of target-company share-
holders. If Rule 13e-3 imposes costs on management-led going-private
transactions (e.g., direct compliance costs, increased litigation costs) and
confers no benefits on target-company shareholders, shareholders them-
selves may bear part of the cost of this Rule in the form of lower premi-
ums (i.e., potential acquirers would require some compensation for
bearing the costs of Rule 13e-3).23
Hence, the importance of information asymmetries in management-led
going-private transactions and the effectiveness of Rule 13e-3 in counter-
balancing these information asymmetries are ultimately empirical issues.
III. SAMPLE AND EVIDENCE
A. Sample
A sample of 336 going-private transactions between 1980 and1988 was
collected from annual editions of the Wall Street Journal Index from this
period. Each corporate entry in these indices was read, and successful
going-private transactions were noted. Going-private transactions, as de-
fined here, convert free-standing, publicly traded corporations into pri-
vately held firms. Hence, buyouts of corporate divisions and private
companies and acquisitions of public firms by other public firms are ex-
cluded from this sample.
Although this sample includes a large number of buyouts in which
23. A cursory search on the LEXIS retrieval system revealed 8 federal appeals court decisions
and 22 federal district court decisions that mentioned Rule 13e-3 during the 1980s. We did not
examine whether the claims made in these cases under Rule 13e-3 were redundant with other claims
(e.g., Rule lOb-5). Similar searches revealed two litigation releases concerning cases brought by the
SEC in federal district courts, three SEC administrative proceedings and 160 SEC no-action letters
citing Rule 13e-3. Although these data are "soft," they do suggest that this Rule results in some
additional litigation costs.
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incumbent management was the bidder, it also includes many transac-
tions in which public companies were acquired by nonmanagement
groups, including investment firms that specialize in leveraged buyouts
(e.g., Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, Forstmann Little, Clayton & Dubilier,
Thomas H. Lee Co.) and private companies.24 Appendix A lists the 336
going-private transactions in the sample.
B. Evidence
1. Are Premiums Lower in Transactions Initiated by Management
or in Which Management is an Equity Participant?
The hypothesis that information asymmetries harm shareholders in
management-led going-private transactions suggests a simple test. If
stockholders are disadvantaged in management buyouts, then the premi-
ums they receive in these transactions should be lower than the corre-
sponding premiums received by shareholders in buyouts led by third
parties. We thus compare premiums paid in two sets of going-private
transactions: management-initiated transactions versus those that are ini-
tiated by third parties, and transactions in which management is an eq-
uity participant versus those in which management is not an equity
participant. Transactions are management initiated if the appropriate
edition of The Wall Street Journal Index indicates that incumbent man-
agers made the initial offers to acquire their respective companies. Fur-
ther, transactions involved management participation if a Schedule 13e-3
was filed in connection with the transaction or it was otherwise disclosed
that some members of incumbent management were expected to
purchase equity in the company after the completion of the transaction.
Finally, for each transaction, the premium is defined as the price of the
stock on the last day it traded less its price twenty trading days prior to
the first announcement of the going-private transaction, divided by the
latter price.
The data in Table 1 reveal that shareholders receive average and me-
dian premiums in going-private transactions initiated by management
(39.51%, 35.23%, respectively) that are slightly lower than the corre-
sponding premiums in going-private transactions initiated by third par-
24. Data presented later in the study reveal that in 190 buyouts, or 56.5% of the sample, in-
cumbent management was the initial bidder. For the 172 buyouts with a value of $100 million or
more, we computed the percentage of equity owned by incumbent management after the transac-
tions. In 117 cases, or 68% of the sample, incumbent management was an equity participant in the
transaction.
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ties (40.01%, 38.82%, respectively). Similarly, the average premium is
slightly smaller in transactions in which incumbent management is an
equity participant (39.65%) than in other transactions (40.31%), but the
median premium is larger (36.92% versus 31.62%). None of the differ-
ences in average premiums are statistically significant, suggesting that, on
average, shareholders are not mistreated, at least with respect to the pre-
miums they receive, in management buyouts vis-i-vis other going-private
transactions.
2. Did Premiums Increase After the Adoption of Rule 13e-3?
The results in Table 1 suggest that relative to other going-private
transactions, management-led going-private transactions do not seem to
deprive shareholders of value. This result may obtain either because in-
formation asymmetries are not nearly as severe as some have argued, or
because Rule 13e-3 has been effective in mitigating this problem. If the
latter is true, we would expect that premiums in management-led going-
private transactions increased significantly following the adoption of
Rule 13e-3 in 1979.
To test this, we computed premiums for all management buyouts listed
in The Wall Street Journal Index between 1976 and 1978 (i.e., the three
years immediately preceding the year that the SEC adopted Rule 13e-3)
and between 1980 and 1982 (i.e., the three years following its adoption).
Our search revealed fourteen management buyouts during the 1976-1978
period and fifty-two management buyouts during the 1980-1982 period.
Premium is defined as above.
The average and median premiums for both periods are listed in Table
2. We find that the average premium for the fourteen pre-Rule transac-
tions is 54.55% (median = 45.02%) and the average premium for the
fifty-two post-Rule transactions involving the filing of a Schedule 13e-3 is
42.29%. Although the decline in the average premium is not statistically
significant, it is noteworthy that premiums did not increase significantly
following the adoption of Rule 13e-3.
To standardize for any trends in general takeover premiums during
this time, we computed the average premium for successful cash tender
offers for both the 1976-1978 and 1980-1982 periods. Our source for this
computation is the data presented by Kevin Nathan and Terrence
O'Keefe, who report average premiums by year for 681 successful take-
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overs between 1963 and 1985.25 Using their data, we found that premi-
ums in 138 takeovers betweem 1976 and 1978 averaged 69.17%, while
the premiums in 76 takeovers between 1980 and 1982 averaged 76.86%.
Hence, the ratio of the average premium in management-led going-pri-
vate transactions to the average premium in all takeovers generally de-
clined from 0.79 before Rule 13e-3 was adopted to 0.55 after it was
adopted. Although these data are limited by the relatively small sample
size in the pre-Rule period, this evidence nonetheless suggests that Rule
13e-3 did not noticeably increase premiums paid to shareholders in man-
agement-led going-private transactions.
3. Are Premiums Lower in "Suspect Transactions" than in 13e-3
Transactions?
There have been a number of transactions in recent years that may
have involved the same purported asymmetric information problem that
gave rise to Rule 13e-3 but that currently are beyond the reach of the
rule. In these transactions, members of existing management, though not
participating in the going-private transaction, are offered the opportunity
to invest in the equity of the company after the transaction and may be
offered lucrative employment contracts as well. The interests of these
members of management may be more closely aligned with the purchas-
ers than with the shareholders they continue to represent.
If, in fact, this conflict is present in these transactions and shareholders
have been treated unfairly as a result, we would expect to find that the
premiums paid to shareholders are smaller than they would have been in
the absence of the conflicts. Furthermore, if Rule 13e-3 is effective in
eliminating or reducing the effects of the conflicts, we would expect to
find that the premiums are smaller in these transactions than they would
have been if Rule 13e-3 had applied to them.
To examine the relation between Rule 13e-3 and premiums, we first
must classify each of the 336 transactions in our sample into one of three
nonoverlapping groups: (1) transactions subject to Rule 13e-3 (that is,
those involving the filing of a Schedule 13e-3); (2) the suspect transac-
tions (that is, third-party transactions in which it was disclosed that
members of existing management were expected to invest in the equity of
the company after the transaction); and (3) strictly third-party transac-
25. Kevin S. Nathan & Terrence O'Keefe, The Rise in Takeover Premiums: An Exploratory
Study, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 101, 106 Table 2 (1989).
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tions (that is, third-party transactions in which it was not anticipated
that existing management would invest). We were able to classify 316 of
the 336 going-private transactions: 227 involved the filing of a Schedule
13e-3; twenty-six fall into the suspect class; and sixty-three are strictly
third-party transactions. Missing data reduce these numbers slightly in
the analyses described below.
Table 3 presents the average percent premiums for each of the three
classes of transactions. These data reveal that the average premium is
highest for the suspect transactions (55.5%) and smallest for the Rule
13e-3 transactions (37.9%). The third-party transactions have an aver-
age premium of 41.2%, somewhat greater than for the Rule 13e-3 trans-
actions and smaller than for the suspect transactions. The difference
between the average values for the Rule 13e-3 transactions and third-
party transactions is not significant, but the average premium for the sus-
pect transactions is significantly larger than the average premium for
both the third-party transactions (at the 0.10 level) and the Rule 13e-3
transactions (at the 0.05 level). Thus, a simple comparison of average
percent premiums offers no indication that shareholders in these suspect
transactions are treated unfairly. In fact, premiums appear to be greater
in these suspect transactions. The list in Table 4 of the twenty-six sus-
pect transactions, along with their corresponding premiums, reveals that
almost seventy-five percent of the suspect transactions (i.e., nineteen of
the twenty-six) had premiums that exceeded the average premium paid in
Rule 13e-3 transactions.
An obvious shortcoming of simple comparisons of average premiums
is that they fail to take into account other important differences that may
affect premiums. In an ideal test of these propositions, we simply would
compare the premiums in the suspect transactions to (1) premiums in
otherwise identical transactions in which the conflicts did not exist (that
is, strictly third-party transactions) and (2) the premiums in otherwise
identical transactions that were subject to Rule 13e-3. Of course, it is
impossible to find either "otherwise identical" third-party buyouts or
"otherwise identical" management buyouts for comparison, but multiple
regression analysis allows us to hold constant other factors that may have
a significant influence on premiums. To the extent that we are able to
identify and measure these other factors, we can isolate the independent
correlation between Rule 13e-3 and premiums.
[Vol. 70:587
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To test the relation between Rule 13e-3 and premiums, the following
regression is estimated:
PCTPREM = a + b (CONTEST) + c (MBOHLDG) + d (MHLDG3)
+ f (DELAWARE) + g (Y80) + h (Y81)
+ i (Y82) + j (Y83) + k (Y85) + 1 (Y86)
+ m (Y87) + n (Y88) + o (R13E3)
+ p (SUSPECT) + e,
where a = a constant term;
PCTPREM = the premium paid to shareholders, calculated as
the difference between the market value of equity on the last day the
company's shares traded publicly and the market value of the company's
equity twenty trading days before the first announcement of the proposed
transaction, divided by the latter (expressed in percentage terms).
CONTEST = a dummy variable indicating whether there was
a competing bid; it equals 1 if there was a competing bid and 0 otherwise.
MBOHLDG = the percent of the company's equity held by
members of management prior to the transaction for those transactions
in which a Schedule 13e-3 was filed or in which members of management
were expected to invest after the transaction (set equal to 0 for third-
party transactions).
MHLDG3 = the percent of the company's equity held by
members of the management prior to the transaction for those transac-
tions in which a Schedule 13e-3 was not filed and members of manage-
ment were not expected to invest after the transaction (set equal to 0 for
transactions in which a Schedule 13e-3 was filed or in which members of
management were expected to invest after the transaction).
DELAWARE = a dummy variable indicating whether the
company was incorporated in Delaware; it equals 1 if the company is
incorporated in Delaware and 0 otherwise.
Y80-Y83 and Y85-Y88 = dummy variables indicating the year
of the first announcement of the proposed transactions; e.g., Y80= 1 if
the first announcement was in 1980 and 0 otherwise; Y81 = 1 if the first
announcement was in 1981 and 0 otherwise; and so on. For transactions
announced in 1984, Y80-Y83=0 and Y85-Y88=0.
R13E3 = a dummy variable indicating whether a Schedule
13e-3 was filed in connection with the transaction; it equals 1 if a Sched-
ule 13e-3 was filed and 0 otherwise.
SUSPECT = a dummy variable identifying the suspect trans-
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actions; it equals 1 if it was disclosed that members of incumbent man-
agement were expected to invest in the company's equity after the
transaction, but no Schedule 13e-3 was filed, and zero otherwise.
b-d, f-p = parameters to be estimated;
e = an error term.
Previous research has found that competing bids are correlated with
higher premiums, since bidding contests inflate premiums.26 Hence, we
expect a positive correlation associated with CONTEST. We anticipate
that the percent of equity held by members of incumbent management
prior to the transaction is positively related to the percent premium for
strictly third-party transactions (MHLDG3), since in such cases the in-
terests of management shareholders would be aligned with those of other
shareholders in proportion to the extent of management equity holdings.
In cases in which a conflict of interest may exist on the part of manage-
ment (that is, the Rule 13e-3 transactions and the suspect transactions),
we might expect a negative estimated coefficient for the management
holdings variable (MBOHLDG), indicating that management is able to
use its holdings to hold down the price it pays to other shareholders (per-
haps, for example, by blocking competing bids).
DELAWARE and indicator variables for the year of the going-private
announcements are included to take into account possible effects of state
law and time trends on premiums.
If management conflicts of interest exist in the suspect transactions,
and if these conflicts result in harm to shareholders, we would expect a
significant negative estimated coefficient for the SUSPECT variable.
Furthermore, an estimated coefficient insignificantly different from zero
for the RULE13E3 variable would be a necessary, but not sufficient, con-
dition for finding that Rule 13e-3 has completely countered the conflicts
presumed to exist in transactions subject to the rule. It would not be a
sufficient condition unless we knew that otherwise identical transactions
26. See, eg., Michael Bradley et al., Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and Their
Division Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1988). We are
not entirely convinced that this variable is properly included in our model. If the competing bid is
induced by an initial offer at what is deemed to be an insufficient price (a "low-ball" bid), the effect of
the competing bid may be simply to raise the offered price to a level that, if offered initially, would
not have attracted the competing bid. However, we include it to take into account the possible effect
of a bidding war on the premium.
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not subject to the Rule had significantly smaller premiums.27 If Rule
13e-3 has reduced, but not eliminated, the effects of the conflicts, the
estimated coefficient could be significantly negative. Thus, this particular
regression analysis cannot draw any firm conclusion with respect to the
effectiveness of Rule 13e-3 as it is now applied.
The results of the first regression estimate appear in Table 5. This
regression uses data from the full sample, which is composed of 222 Rule
13e-3 transactions, fifty-two third-party transactions, and twenty-six sus-
pect transactions.
As expected, the estimated coefficient associated with the CONTEST
variable is positive and significant. It indicates that transactions involv-
ing a competing bid, holding other factors constant, have premiums that
are 13.85% larger than other transactions.
The DELAWARE variable, for which we had no strong expectations,
has a negative estimated coefficient that is not significant. Among the
year variables, only Y82, Y87, and Y88 had estimated coefficients that
are significant at the 0.10 level.
There is no evidence from our regression that the management hold-
ings prior to the transaction have any direct influence on the size of the
premium; that is, the estimated coefficient on MBOHLDG is indistin-
guishable from zero. However, it may have some indirect influence
through its effect on the CONTEST variable.2" Though still insignifi-
cant, the estimated coefficient on MHLDG3 is much larger and far closer
to significance than the estimated coefficient on MBOHLDG. This rep-
resents weak evidence that management holdings in third-party transac-
tions are more likely to affect premiums than are management holdings
in management buyouts.
27. Some evidence on this issue is presented below.
28. Logit analysis indicates that the single most influential factor affecting the likelihood of a
competing bid is the holdings of management prior to the transaction. Thus, to some extent, the
influence of management holdings on the size of the premium is captured by the CONTEST variable
in our regression equation. We find, however, that the management-holding variables change very
little when the CONTEST variable is excluded from the regression model. The estimated coefficient
for the MBOHLDG variable changes from being insignificantly positive (as shown in Table 5) to
being insignificantly negative. The estimated coefficient for the MHLDG3 variable is even less af-
fected, changing from 0.27 to 0.26 with a slightly smaller t-statistic (1.30 versus 1.38).
It is important to note that, based on our logit analysis, the SUSPECT variable has a significant
positive correlation with the likelihood of a competing bid, while the correlation between the R13E3
variable and the likelihood of a competing bid is not significant. Thus, evidence from our logit
analysis suggests that the suspect transactions would not attract more competing bids if they were
subject to Rule 13e-3.
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The estimated coefficient for R13E3 meets the necessary (but not suffi-
cient) condition for a finding that Rule 13e-3 has effectively countered
the conflicts of interest presumed to be present in transactions subject to
the Rule; that is, it is insignificantly different from zero. This result tells
us that premiums in Rule 13e-3 transactions are the same as in compara-
ble third-party transactions.
The estimated coefficient for the SUSPECT variable is positive, but not
significantly different from zero. The failure to find a significant negative
estimated coefficient for this variable is inconsistent with the view that
these transactions involve conflicts of interest that work to the detriment
of shareholders.
As noted above, the current regression analysis cannot lead to unam-
biguous conclusions regarding the effectiveness of Rule 13e-3 in coun-
tering the presumed conflicts of interest. If we assume for the moment,
however, that the conflicts would in fact have caused the premiums in
Rule 13e-3 transactions to be smaller absent the Rule, we can use regres-
sion analysis to test for the existence of the same conflicts in the suspect
transactions. If those same conflicts exist, we expect to find that the pre-
miums in the suspect transactions are smaller than in otherwise identical
Rule 13e-3 transactions. To test this proposition, we re-estimate the re-
gression model for the sample consisting of only the 222 Rule 13e-3
transactions and the twenty-six suspect transactions.29
The results of the re-estimation are shown in Table 6. The variable of
interest, of course, is SUSPECT. We find that the estimated coefficient
for this variable is significantly positive at the 0.10 level, which is incon-
sistent with the argument that shareholders are disadvantaged in the sus-
pect transactions. We cannot conclude from this that the suspect
transactions pose the same potential conflicts of interest presumed to ex-
ist in the Rule 13e-3 transactions. Rather, it appears that the same con-
flicts either do not exist or Rule 13e-3 somehow exacerbates them.
We do not have a good explanation for the result that the suspect
transactions have significantly larger premiums than comparable Rule
13e-3 transactions. As with any regression analysis, it is possible that
some unidentified factors that should have been included in the model
have been left out. With this in mind, we added several financial variables
29. Two changes in the model are necessitated by the exclusion of the third-party transactions:
(1) we exclude the MHLDG3 variable, since it only applies to third-party transactions; and (2) we
exclude the R13E3 variable, since we now have only two mutually exclusive groups and the SUS-
PECT variable is sufficient to distinguish between them.
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(both together and separately) to the model and re-estimated the equa-
tion.3 0 Although the estimated coefficient associated with SUSPECT de-
clined in significance, its sign never changed.31
The above analysis suggests that the suspect transactions do not de-
prive shareholders of potentially higher premiums. The premiums in
these transactions are not smaller than those in comparable third-party
transactions. Furthermore, the premiums in these transactions are sig-
nificantly larger than those in comparable Rule 13e-3 transactions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Critics of management-led going-private transactions logically argue
that an inherent conflict of interest exists since management simultane-
ously acts as agent for the shareholders and principal of the acquiring
entity. However, because managers are constrained by both market and
legal forces in these transactions, it is unclear whether this conflict of
interest actually results in harm to shareholders.
We find no evidence that premiums are systematically lower in trans-
actions in which this conflict is likely to be the greatest, namely, transac-
tions initiated by management and transactions in which management is
an equity participant. Although this result may suggest that Rule 13e-3
is effective in mitigating these conflicts, we are doubtful because (1) pre-
miums in going-private transactions did not increase after this Rule was
adopted, and (2) premiums in transactions that are exempt from Rule
13e-3 and in which management is an equity participant are actually
higher than premiums in 13e-3 transactions. However logical the critics'
argument may be, as an empirical matter, shareholders seem to be pro-
tected effectively by market and legal forces in management-led going-
private transactions.
30. The variables added include sales, sales growth, debt-to-asset ratio, the ratio of cash flow to
sales, the ratio of undistributed cash flow to sales, the ratio of undistributed cash flow to the market
value of equity, the ratio of research and development expenditures to sales, the ratio of capital
expenditures to sales, the ratio of tax expense to cash flow, and the standard deviation of the ratio of
cash flow to sales. Except for the last of these, the variables were measured over the year preceding
the year of the first announcement of the transaction. The last variable was measured over the five
years preceding the year of the announcement.
31. The t-statistic ranged from 1.26 to 1.88 in these regressions.
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TABLE 1
Average and Median Premiums for Four Categories of Going-Private
Transactions (GPs): GPs Initiated by Management, GPs Initiated by Third Parties,
GPs with Management Participation, and GPs without Management Participation.
Sample
Management Initiated Transactions
Third-Party Initiated Transactions
Transactions with Management Participation
Transactions without Management Participation
Average Median
N Premium Premium
187 39.51
142 40.01
35.23
38.82
Source: 13e, 14A and 14D filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Wall Street
Journal and Standard and Poor's Daily Stock Price Record.
TABLE 2
253 39.65 36.92
54 40.31 31.62
Average and Median Premiums in Management-Led
Going-Private Transactions, Before and After
Adoption of Rule 13e-3, Relative to Average
Premiums in Successful Cash Tender Offers
Period
Before Rule 13e-3
1976-1978
After Rule 13e-3
1980-1982
Period
Before Rule 13e-3
1976-1978
After Rule 13e-3
1980-1982
(1)
Average Premium
in Management-Led
Going Private Transactions
54.55 (N= 14)
42.29 (N=52)
(1)
Median Premium
in Management-Led
Going Private Transactions
45.02 (N= 14)
40.32 (N=52)
(2)
Average Premium
in Cash Tender
Offers
69.17 (N= 138)
76.86 (N=76)
(2)
Average Premium
in Cash Tender
Offers
69.17 (N= 138)
76.86 (N=76)
Source for average premiums in cash tender offers is Kevin S. Nathan & Terrence O'Keefe, The Rise
in Takeover Premiums: An Exploratory Study, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 101 (1989). Average premiums for
the two periods were computed from Table 2 of that article. See id. at 106.
Ratio
of
(1) to (2)
0.79
0.55
Ratio
of
(1) to (2)
0.65
0.52
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss2/17
INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES
TABLE 3
Comparison of Mean Percent Premiums
for Rule 13e-3, Third-Party, and Suspect Transactions
(1980-1988)
Number
227
Mean
37.88
41.25
55.53
Percent Premium
Std. Deviation
29.01
34.42
32.32
T=statistics Corresponding to Differences of Means
Rule 13e-3
Third-Party
Suspect
* Corresponds to significance level of 0.05.
Corresponds to significance level of 0.10.
0.67
2.66*
Suspect
1.81 **
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TABLE 4
Premiums Paid in 26 Third-Party Going-Private
Transactions in Which Incumbent Managers
Were Likely to Be Equity Participants
Company
American Appraisal Associates
Arkansas Best
Avondale Mills
Beatrice
Bickford
Dillingham
Grantree
Joy Mfg.
Knudsen
Midland Glass
Midland Ross
Mohasco
Norris Industries
Owens Illinois
Pacific Realty Trust
RJR Nabisco
Spectradyne
Stanadyne
Stop & Shop
Storer Communications
Systems Engineering
II Morrow
Triangle Pacific
Walter Jim
Wometco Enterprises
Woodward & Lothrop
Year Premium
1984 39.17
1988 90.74
1986 63.04
1985 50.38
1982 41.67
1982 57.14
1987 62.75
1986 50.56
1982 120.77
1983 30.67
1986 45.45
1988 113.33
1981 44.92
1986 39.48
1982 30.77
1988 56.11
1987 60.81
1988 139.13
1988 97.19
1985 61.56
1987 20.51
1986 23.33
1986 27.93
1987 9.84
1983 27.93
1984 38.51
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TABLE 5
Regression Results for Model of Premiums
(Dependent Variable = Percent Premium)
Full Sample
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic
INTERCEPT 32.53 4.68 *
CONTEST 13.85 3.36 *
MBOHLDG 0.01 0.08
MHLDG3 0.27 1.38
DELAWARE -2.28 -0.65
Y80 13.97 1.48
Y81 -0.53 -0.07
Y82 12.29 1.75 *
683 -2.12 -0.31
Y85 -6.48 -1.00
Y86 5.80 0.89
Y87 -10.35 - 1.76 ***
Y88 17.41 2.92 *
Rl3E3 0.08 0.01
SUSPECT 11.84 1.45
Adjusted R-squared = 0.117
Number of observations = 300
• Corresponds to significance level of 0.01.
•* Corresponds to significance level of 0.05.
•** Corresponds to significance level of 0.010.
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TABLE 6
Regression Results for Model of Premiums
(Dependent Variable = Percent Premium)
R13e-3 and Suspect Transactions Only
Variable Coefficient
INTERCEPT 40.71
CONTEST 20.00
MBOHLDG 0.04
DELAWARE -2.19
Y80 16.12
Y81 2.96
Y82 13.32
Y83 1.59
Y85 -2.47
Y86 4.17
Y87 -11.20
Y88 17.27
SUSPECT 11.10
Adjusted R-squared = 0.148
Number of observations = 248
* Corresponds to significance level of 0.01.
* Corresponds to significance level of 0.10.
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t-Statistic
5.28 *
4.48 *
0.44
-0.62
1.75 *
0.37
1.80 ***
0.22
-0.35
0.62
-1.73 ***
2.75 *
1.87 ***
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Company
ACF
Aeronca
AFG Indus.
After Six
Alamito
Albany Int'l
Alleco
Allied Van Lines
Aloha
Altamil
Amalgamated Sugar
Amdisco
Amerace
American Appraisal Assoc.
American Bakeries
American Equity Inv.
American Fin. Corp.
American Health Cos.
American Standard
American Sterilizer
Amstar
Amsted
Anderson Indus.
APL Corp.
ARA Servs.
Arcata
Arkansas Best
Arley Merchandise
Atlas Van Lines
Avondale Mills
Axia
Barton Brands
Baylesa (AJ.) Markets
Bayswater Realty & Capital
Beatrice Cos.
Beeline
Belknap
Bell & Howell
Belscot Retailers
Berkeley Bio-Medical
Best Prods.
Beverage Management
Bibb
Bickford
Big V Supermarkets
Biltrite
Blue Bell
Bluewater Oil & Gas Ltd.
Bomaine
Bond Indus.
Borg-Warner
Brockway
Brooks Fashion Stores
Bro-Dart
Budget Rent-A-Car
Burlington Indus.
Burnham Serv. Corp.
Cadence Indus.
California Life Corp.
APPENDIX A
Announcement
Date Company
09-20-83 Calton
05-20-86 Cannon Mills
02-25-88 Capitol Food Indus.
05-15-84 Caressa Group
11-04-85 Carrols
04-13-83 Catalyst Energy
07-11-88 CCI
09-19-81 Ceco Indus.
02-03-86 Cedar Point
06-27-83 Cellu-Craft
09-02-82 Central Soya
09-01-82 Chadwick-Miller
05-15-84 Charter Medical
06-29-84 CHB Foods
10-22-86 Clevepak
02-22-84 Clow
11-26-80 Coca Cola Bottling (Miami)
07-26-88 Coca Cola Bottling (NY)
01-27-88 Cole Nat'l
09-19-84 Color Tile
09-29-83 Colt Indus.
11-04-85 Columbus Mills
03-17-86 Comtel
09-26-86 Conair
07-12-84 Condec
08-17-81 Cone Mills
05-02-88 Continental Group
06-26-86 Cook Int'l
05-29-84 Copeland
01-15-86 Cowles Broadcasting
02-17-84 Cox Communications
05-24-82 Craddock-Terry Shoe
01-13-84 Criton
06-23-86 Cullum Cos.
10-16-85 Cunningham Drug Stores
06-21-84 Dan River
01-25-84 Data Sys. Analysts
11-06-87 Decision Indus.
01-14-80 Dellwood Foods
03-16-82 Denny's
08-11-88 Dentsply Int'l
10-15-82 Devon Group
06-25-85 Devry
02-22-82 Diamond Crystal
06-15-87 Dickey-John
12-20-84 Dicomed Corp.
07-24-84 Dillingham
09-26-84 Dinner Bell Foods
05-15-84 Dixico
10-27-80 Dr. Pepper
10-30-86 Duckwall Alco Stores
09-17-87 Duralith
08-06-84 Duro-Test
04-13-83 Dyncorp
10-31-88 Easco
04-24-87 Eckerd (Jack)
01-25-88 Edgcomb Steel N.E.
04-15-83 Edgewater Corp.
03-18-81 Elder-Beerman Stores
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04-11-85
01-05-82
08-27-82
10-15-84
09-24-86
12-27-87
09-24-82
04-15-86
03-21-83
09-08-83
03-14-85
05-25-84
09-27-87
01-17-85
06-30-85
03-28-85
01-31-83
11-24-80
06-04-84
08-15-86
03-10-88
11-04-86
03-26-81
12-12-84
11-02-83
11-29-83
06-05-84
11-09-84
02-17-81
04-09-84
04-08-85
11-15-85
08-24-82
06-27-88
10-27-80
10-04-82
03-22-80
09-30-87
07-29-82
05-30-84
05-14-82
07-15-82
05-18-87
04-25-88
07-14-87
10-13-87
11-16-82
08-25-87
05-06-85
11-17-83
01-08-85
04-26-85
08-24-87
09-01-87
12-31-84
10-10-85
10-04-85
11-06-81
03-13-87
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Company
Elixir Indus.
Empire
Energy Fact
Ero
Executive Indus.
Fair Lanes
Farm Fresh
Fay (Leslie)
Financial Gen. Banks
Flexi-Van
Flickinger (S.M.)
Florida Steel,
Foodmaker
Fort Howard Paper
Friona Indus.
Funtime
GAF
Gateway Indus.
GIT Industries
Glosser Bros.
Gold Medallion
Golden State Foods
Golden West Homes
Grantree
Great Am. Indus.
Guardian Indus.
Gulfstream Land & Dev.
Harte-Hanks Communications
Harvard Indus.
High Voltage
Horizons Research
Hospital Corp. of Am.
House of Ronnie
Hyatt Int'l
II Morrow
Infinity Broadcasting
Intercole
Interstate Bakeries
International Controls
Jetero
Jewelcor
Jim Walter
Jones & Vining
Josephson Int'l
Joy Mfg.
Kaiser Steel
Kampgrounds of Am.
Kane Furniture
Kane-Miller
KDI
Kearney Nat'l
Keller Indus.
Knudsen
Kroy
Lamston (M.H.)
Lear Siegler
Leasco
Leaseway Transp.
Lehigh Press
Levi Strauss
Announcement
Date
10-27-81
10-21-82
11-05-87
03-11-88
02-04-81
11-28-86
03-10-88
10-30-81
03-02-82
02-16-88
03-19-84
07-08-88
08-29-88
06-22-88
02-08-85
09-14-87
12-15-87
08-06-81
12-01-80
01-28-85
06-04-81
04-14-80
11-13-85
07-01-87
10-24-84
07-09-84
05-20-85
03-27-84
08-02-88
01-06-88
07-17-87
09-15-88
03-12-81
03-23-81
10-07-86
06-09-88
12-10-84
08-11-87
04-23-87
04-26-82
10-23-87
07-16-87
01-23-87
01-08-88
12-01-86
05-09-83
11-26-80
06-29-82
10-31-83
06-08-88
03-21-88
04-17-83
10-18-82
07-14-86
03-25-83
10-30-86
07-14-81
04-23-86
10-20-86
07-11-85
Company
Levitz Furniture
Liberty Fabrics of N.Y.
Little (Arthur D.)
Loehmann's
Lynden
Lyon Metal Prods.
MacAndrews & Forbes
Macy (R.H.)
Malone & Hyde
Marley
Mary Kay Cosmetics
Massmutual Mtg. & Rlty.
Masters
Mayflower Group
Medford
Meenan Oil
Metromedia
Meyer (Fred)
Micom Sys.
Midland Glass
Midland-Ross
Minstar
Mississippi Valley Gas
Mohasco
Mohawk Rubber
Morse Shoe
Mount Vernon Mills
Munford
Musicland
Nathan's Famous
National Gypsum
National Medical Care
National Shoes
National Spinning
NFA
Niagara Frontier Servs.
Noel Indus.
Norris Indus.
North Am. Communications
North Am. Royalties
Northwest Indus.
Northwestern Steel & Wire
Nutri/System
Owens-Illinois
Oxford First
Pacific Realty Trust
Palomar Fin.
Pamida
Pandick
Papercraft
Paramount Packaging
Pargas
Parisian
Parsons
Pat Fashions
Pawnee Indus.
Pay N Pak
Pay N Save
Payless Cashways
Perfect Fit
Announcement
Date
06-01-84
10-06-83
03-16-88
09-25-80
08-06-87
01-18-84
05-16-83
10-21-85
06-08-84
12-01-80
05-30-85
03-04-85
10-16-80
09-29-86
07-09-84
08-24-83
12-06-83
04-02-81
04-26-88
10-18-83
07-01-86
03-31-88
03-26-84
02-16-88
11-02-83
02-18-87
01-27-82
05-23-88
02-02-88
11-04-86
11-25-85
08-06-84
12-10-84
08-21-80
08-07-84
01-27-83
06-15-87
07-23-81
09-30-87
04-27-83
09-20-84
02-05-88
02-05-86
12-11-86
04-04-88
11-16-82
06-03-83
06-20-80
11-12-86
04-09-85
01-21-85
01-10-83
07-28-87
09-13-84
11-06-81
09-30-86
04-02-87
08-31-84
05-19-88
05-13-85
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Company
Pizza Inn
Plantronics
Ponderosa
Post Corp.
PRF
Professional Care Servs.
PT Components
Pueblo Int'l
Purex Indus.
Puritan Fashions
Questor
Rapid-American
Raymond Int'l
Redken Lab.
Reeves Bros.
Reliance Group
Republic Health
Research-Cottrell
Resorts Int'l.
Restaurant Assocs. Indus.
Revco D,S.
Revere Copper & Brass
Revlon
Rhodes
Riblet Prods.
Riegel Textile
Rio Grande Indus.
Rival Mfg.
RJR Nabisco
Royal Crown Cos.
Russell Stover Candies
Rusty Pelican Restaurants
Safeway Stores
Sage-Allen
Schaefer (FM)
Scholastic
SCOA Indus.
Scott Cable Communications
Seaman's Furniture
Seligman & Latz
Seton
SFN Cos.
Sheller-Globe
Shoe-Town
Signode
Singer
Soundesign
Southland
Speciality Equip.
Spectradyne
Announcement
Date
07-10-86
08-04-88
11-24-86
09-08-83
06-06-80
12-28-83
02-20-86
12-24-87
01-28-82
11-14-83
03-22-82
04-11-80
05-05-83
05-26-88
02-04-82
07-14-81
01-03-86
06-08-87
02-01-88
08-25-87
03-11-86
03-20-86
03-06-87
04-26-88
06-12-86
06-20-85
10-01-84
09-24-85
10-21-88
01-11-84
09-22-81
06-24-87
07-08-86
07-31-87
12-02-80
10-22-86
07-01-85
02-03-87
11-09-87
04-10-85
03-16-87
08-23-84
02-14-86
12-15-87
03-01-82
10-29-87
11-23-81
06-17-87
07-23-88
05-07-87
Company
Splentex
Stanadyne
Standard Coosa Thatcher
Standun
Stater Bros.
Stop & Shop Cos.
Storer Communications
Supermarkets Gen.
Susquehanna
Sybron
Systems Engineering
Taft Broadcasting
Tannetics
Techamerica Group
Ti-Caro
Topps Chewing Gum
Towermarc
Tracor
Trans World Airlines
Triangle Pac.
Twentieth Century Fox
UI Group
Union Special
Uniroyal
Unitog
Universal Cigar
Up-Right
U.S. Truck Lines
U.S. Sugar
Valle's Steak House
Van Dusen Air
Vaughan-Jacklin
Vendo
Video Corp. of Am.
Volume Merchandise
Vortec
Warnaco
Washington Homes
Wehr
Welbilt
Wherehouse Entertainment
Wickes Cos.
Williamhouse Regency
Wilton Enter.
Wometco Enters.
Woodward & Lothrop
Work Wear
York Int'l
1992]
Announcement
Date
08-28-80
01-10-88
03-23-82
05-29-85
05-13-87
01-14-88
03-19-85
03-09-87
09-16-87
01-13-86
08-1 1-88
03-06-87
02-03-86
07-21-87
12-02-83
11-16-83
04-19-84
09-14-87
04-25-88
03-04-86
02-20-81
12-29-83
01-28-88
04-09-85
11-01-83
06-21-83
09-16-87
08-19-87
10-09-87
11-20-81
07-31-85
01-31-83
02-01-88
03-01-84
06-11-84
02-08-88
10-31-85
09-18-87
10-27-82
07-05-88
10-13-87
08-22-88
07-08-82
07-07-88
08-19-83
02-22-84
10-29-85
06-27-88
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